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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CREST MOTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff-respondent~ 
vs. 
ALEXANDER S. FISH, 
Defendant-appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9958 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover 
damages alleged to have accrued when a Cadillac auto-
mobile purchased by the plaintiff through the defend-
ant turned out to have been stolen. The plaintiff con-
tended that the defendant was an independent car 
dealer in Dteroit, Michigan, and that the Cadillac 
automobile was purchased from the defendant as owner 
of the car and as such dealer. The defendant contended 
that the car was purchased by the plaintiff himself with 
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the defendant acting only as a factor-agent for the 
plaintiff in finding and negotiating with the owner for 
the purchase of the Cadillac automobile concerned and 
that as factor;,agent the defendant is not liable to the 
plaintiff for the imperfect title. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Ray VanCott, Jr., found in favor of the plaintiff in the 
sum of $8,185.15 plus costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff and prays that the defendant be awarded 
judgment of no cause of action as to the plaintiff's 
complaint in that on the basis of evidence adduced at 
the trial the judgment is contrary to the law and the 
facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime during 1961 the plaintiff and defendant 
orally agreed in Detroit, Michigan, at the home of the 
defendant to enter into a relationship whereby the de-
fendant would act for the plaintiff in finding cars for 
the plaintiff to purchase. (Page 46-48 transcript). The 
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parties entered into a course of dealing based upon this 
agreement from 1961 until approximately February, 
1962, during which time the defendant located auto-
mobiles owned by third parties but which were avail-
able for the plaintiff to purchase or for the defendant 
to purchase for the plaintiff. Over this period the 
defendant located some 25 to 30 automobiles which 
were bought by the plaintiff or which the defendant 
bought for the plaintiff, all of whic hwere shipped from 
Detroit to Salt Lake City for the plaintiff. In some of 
these cases the plaintiff called the defendant and asked 
him to locate or procure for the plaintiff a certain type 
of automobile. (Page 46 transcript). On other instances 
the defendant, knowing of the plaintiff's needs, would 
call the plaintiff and inform him that a certain car was 
available. The plaintiff exercised control as to whether 
or not the car asked for by the plaintiff or suggested 
by the defendant was purchased and upon what terms. 
(Page 36 transcript). In no instance did the defendant 
ever have title in his name to any of the cars, nor did 
he own any of them and his possession of them was 
always temporary in nature for the purposes of the 
agency. (Page 21 transcript). Furthermore, in no 
case did the defendant buy any such car for himself 
prior to the purchase for and delivery to the plaintiff. 
In the majority of situations in the defendant's dealing 
with the plaintiff the automobiles were purchased di-
rectly from used car dealers in Detroit with the plain-
tiff mailing the purchase money for the cars in the form 
of a draft made out to the name of the said owner-
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dealer. The defendant in these cases merely found 
the automobiles, negotiated the price, aranged transfer 
of title directly from the owner-dealer to the plaintiff 
and shipped the car to the plaintiff. (Page 56 tran-
script). In a few instances the money was mailed to 
the defendant in his name and to his own bank account. 
This occurred in those minority situations where the 
car owner was other than a used car dealer and the 
defendant had to use his own funds to accomplish the 
purchase. 
Prior to February, 1962, the plaintiff called the 
defendant in Detroit and told him that he wanted a 
late model Cadillac automobile for his personal use. 
(Page 51 transcript). This was to be a Sedan DeVille 
or a Fleetwood with air conditioning. The defendant 
thereupon contacted dealers in Detroit advising them 
of his desire to find such an automobile. The defendant 
thereafter was called by a Lincoln used car manager, 
named Mr. Y oungham, who informed him that he knew 
of a Cadillac car the defendant might be interested in. 
The owner of the Cadillac, Mr. Ted Cox, was then 
sent by Mr. Youngham with his automobile to the 
defendant's office. The defendant called the plaintiff 
and advised him of the 1960 Cadillac that the defendant 
could get for the plaintiff. The defendant also sug· 
gested that a Chevrolet was still available and that he 
could have them both and they would help to make 
up a load for shipment to Salt Lake. The plaintiff 
then told the defendant to go ahead and see what he 
could do after he had been told the cost would be 
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$3,000.00 for both cars, broken down as $2,500.00 for 
the Cadillac, $400.00 for the Chevrolet and $100.00 
for the defendant as commission or fee. The defendant 
then asked Mr. Cox to produce the title to the Cadillac 
and the defendant checked the serial number on the 
title against the serial number stamped on a plate 
fastened to the automobile door and he found they 
were the same. He then asked Mr. Cox to identify 
himself to insure that he was the owner shown on the 
title. He so identified himself. 
Upon checking the title the defendant noted that 
the owner, Mr. Cox, had only paid some $80.00 sales 
tax on the car which indicated that he had bought it 
for approximately $2,000.00. This made the defendant 
suspicious so he called the Detroit Police Auto Squad 
to see if anything was wrong with the car or the record 
title. The Sergeant of Police advised the defendant 
he would check the car out and would call back. The 
defendant then called the plaintiff and told of his con-
cern about the car's title and that the Detroit Police 
were checking into it. He also told the plaintiff not 
to wire him the purchase price until he called him back. 
About 4:30 p.m. the Sergeant called the defendant 
and said the car was okay. He said, however, that the 
address given by the seller, Mr. Cox, was in an area 
where wrecked automobiles were repaired so he had 
better check to make sure he wasn't buying a wreck 
but that otherwise nothing derogatory appeared against 
the car or the title. 
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The defendant then had a nearby Lincoln dealer 
put the Cadillac upon a hoist and they checked the 
car for evidence of its being wrecked. No such evidence 
was found. The defendant then telephoned the plaintiff 
and told him the police had cleared the title and it was 
not a wreck and to go ahead and wire the money. The 
plaintiff was informed that the seller, Mr. Cox, wanted 
his money right then and therefore the defendant would 
issue him his personal check to secure the deal but that 
the plaintiff should be sure to send the money to his 
account quickly because the defendant didn't have 
enough money in his account to cover such a check. The 
defendant then wrote into the record title the name of 
the plaintiff as the buyer and Mr. Cox signed the title 
as seller-owner and the defendant notarized the seller's 
signature. At no time was. title to the car in the name 
of the defendant nor did he ever possess it as owner. 
The seller was told not to cash the check until the next 
day, when the money from the plaintiff would reach 
the account of the defendant. The seller, Mr. Cox, 
departed with the defendant's check, leaving the car 
in the possession of the defendant. The money from 
the plaintiff did not arrive the next day and Mr. Cox 
kept checking with the defendant to see why not. 
Finally the money reached the defendant's account 
after the defendant had called the plaintiff to see if 
it had been sent and the check was then presented to 
the defendant's -bank by Mr. Cox and was honored 
out of funds sent by the plaintiff. The car was then 
shipped by the defendant from Detroit to the plaintiff 
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in Salt Lake City on a railroad flat car along with 
the Chevrolet and other cars belonging to the plaintiff 
and other car dealers in Utah. 
The defendant is not a dealer buying and selling 
cars in Michigan. (Page 44 transcript). To do so 
under Michigan law he would have to be licensed and 
would take title in his name and possession of the cars 
concerned as owner and would pay sales taxes upon 
the cars when he acquired them. Instead, the defendant 
found cars for the plaintiff and negotiated with the 
owner, either a dealer or as in this case a private indi-
\ridual, to purchase the cars for the plaintiff. (Page 46 
transcript). The defendant took only temporary pos-
sessions of the cars, checked the titles, bought them 
for the plaintiff when told to do so and shipped them. 
As compensation for this the defendant received a fee 
on the transportation of the cars to the plaintiff in the 
form of drive-away or rail deliveries. These fees fluc-
tuated upon various circumstances. Further, if the 
purchase itself was a favorable one, the defendant took 
a variable commission from the actual seller-buyer 
purchase price. In the case at hand this was $100.00 
for the two cars bought by the plaintiff for $3,000.00. 
This conunission was compensation for finding the cars 
for the plaintiff and negotiating the purchase by the 
plaintiff from the owners. 
The plaintiff testified that while in Detroit he 
had purchased two cars from the defendant at the 
defendant's home. This was not the case, however, as 
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those cars belonged to a. used car dealer who had a lot 
adjacent to the defendant's home and the defendant 
did not own or possess those cars but bought them from 
the dealer when the plaintiff said he wanted them and 
gave the defendant the money to buy them. (Page 57 
transcript) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE 
CADILLAC AUTOMOBILE CONCERNED IN 
THIS MATTER WAS THAT OF PRINCIPAL 
AND AGENT IN THAT THE SAID AUTO-
MOBILE WAS PROCURED BY THE DE-
FENDANT AS A FACTOR FOR AND ON BE-
HALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is considered that the record clearly discloses 
that the defendant served as agent-factor of the plain-
tiff in the purchase of the 1960 Cadillac automobile 
concerned herein. All essential elements of such relation-
ship are established. Restatement of Agency, 2nd 
Edition, Section 14, states: "One who contracts to ac-
quire property from a third person and convey it to 
another is the agent of the other only if it is agreed 
that he is to act primarily for the benefit for the other 
and not himself. Typical situations of this is the pur-
chase of land through a broker. Factors indicating no 
10 
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agency are ( 1) that he is to receive a fixed price for 
the property irrespective of the price paid by him. ( 2) 
that he acts in his own name and receives title to the 
property which he is thereafter to transfer. (3) that 
he has an independent business in buying and selling 
similar property." 
In the case at hand the defendant did not receive 
a fixed price for the property irrespective of the price 
paid. (Pages 37, 63, 64 transcript). His fee or com-
mission fluctuated depending upon the circumstances 
of the sale, the time of year and whether or not a par-
ticularly good price was negotiated for the plaintiff. 
Secondly, the defendant did not act in his own name 
and he never received title or ownership of the cars 
involved. Both the owner-seller and the plaintiff knew 
this. Mr. Cox was notified that he had to wait until 
funds came from the plaintiff before he could cash 
defendant's check. The plaintiff knew the defendant 
was not selling cars himself for drafts were usually 
mailed made out directly to dealers in Detroit. (Pages 
27, 72 transcript). }""'~urther, plaintiff knew that in no 
case did defendant appear as owner on any titles. It 
was thus known to both parties that the defendant 
merely negotiated the purchase for the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff testified (page 20 transcript) that in no in-
stance did he send money to Mr. Fish in Mr. Fish's 
name. The plaintiffs money was always used exclusively 
and the transaction was not consummated in the case 
at hand until the plaintiff's draft reached the account 
of the defendant. Thirdly, it is clear that the defendant 
11 
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had no independent business in buying and selling 
automobiles. He never took title to cars he negotiated 
for and he never owned any he negotiated for. 
The plaintiff (page 13 transcript) testified that 
it is a usual practice for automobile dealers not to have 
title to cars they were selling. The plaintiff is a dealer 
in Utah and this may be the case in Utah or at least 
his opinion of it, but it is apparent that such is not the 
case under the laws of Michigan, where these trans-
actions took place. The Compiled Laws of Michigan, 
Motor Vehicle Title, reflects this. Section 256.101 
defines a dealer as any person engaged in the purchase 
and sale of motor vehicles. Section 256.103 provides 
that the owner must transfer title on the back of the 
record title to the purchaser and deliver title to him. 
The purchaser or transferee, unless such person is a 
dealer licensed under Section 14, shall within 10 days 
present the title to the Secretary of State accompanied 
by a $1.00 fee for issuance of a new title. Section 
256.104 provides that failure to adhere to these pro-
visions is a misdemeanor. Section 256.114 provides it 
shall be unlawful for any person to carry on or conduct 
the business of buying or selling motor vehicles unless 
and until he shall have received a license from the Sec-
retary of State authorizing the carrying on or con-
ducting of such business. Such li_cense shall be furnished 
annually. Section 256.2 states that every dealer in new 
or second hand vehicles· shall before delivering any 
motor vehicle to a purchaser make application to the 
12 
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Secretary of State for a new title and pay sales tax 
thereon. 
The defendant was not licensed in Michigan. (Page 
~5 transcript) . He did not pay sales taxes or arrange 
for issuance of new titles on cars and held none in his 
own name as buyer or seller. Instead it is clear from 
his relationship with the plaintiff that he located cars 
for and on behalf of the plaintiff but did not buy them 
for himself for he took no title, secured no new titles 
and paid no sales tax. Inasmuch as he was not a dealer 
but only an agent who negotiated for the purchase of 
the car between the owner-seller and the plaintiff-buyer, 
using in every case the funds of the plaintiff, he did 
not have to be licensed or pay taxes. 
As to the automobile concerned herein the testi-
mony is that the plaintiff told the defendant he wanted 
a particular type of automobile he could use for him-
self and the defendant was to find such a car. (Page 
51, (transcript). It is evident the plaintiff didn't him-
self have one for sale, otherwise the deal could have 
been consummated the moment the plaintiff's desire was 
made known. The defendant then started searching for 
such a car as both parties knew he would have ·to do. 
It is admitted that the defendant had substantial free-
dom and independence. in the methods he used to find 
this car and others. (Page 48 transcript). Once a car 
was located and negotiations were commenced the de-
fendant used his best efforts to obtain a favorable price 
with the planitiff exercising ultimate control over the 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purchase of the car. The plaintiff clearly did not control 
the detailed hour to hour actions of the defendant but 
this does not make him any the less the agent of the 
plaintiff. Restatement of the Law of Agency, 2nd 
Edition, Section 53, states: "The phrases to buy and 
to sell are ambiguous. The language used in connection 
with them, the relation of the parties, the usages of the 
business of the principal or agent and other circum-
stances determine what meaning is to be given to them. 
An agent of a non-resident principal is likely to have 
wider authority than if the principal is nearby. On the 
other hand the fact that the business of the agent is 
primarily that of soliciting indicates that he is author-
ized to do more than find a customer." 
Noteworthy in this regard is American Juris pru-
dence, Brokers, Section 4. There is summarized the 
view that a broker is an agent but as to his physical 
activities he is an independent contractor. (Emphasis 
added) . Section 9, American Jurisprudence, Factors, 
states that ordinarily the authority of a factor with 
respect to merchandise is that of a general agent but 
he may not buy goods for his principal unless he is 
specifically directed to do so. The circumstances of 
the agency exhibited between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant clearly fits these general statements. Section 2, 
American Jurisprudence, Brokers, provides that as 
generally defined a broker is an agent who, for a com-
mission or brokerage fee, bargains or carries on nego-
tiations in behalf of his principal as an intermediary 
between the latter and third persons in transacting 
14 
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business relative to the sale or purchase of any form 
of property the custody of which is not intrusted to 
him for the purpose of discharging his agency. Section 
6, American Juris prudence, Factors, then states that 
a factor is an agent intrusted with possession and he 
not only negotiates the contract of sale or purchase but 
is in duty bound to carry such contract through to per-
formance in behalf of his principal. The character of 
factor and broker is sometimes combined (emphasis 
added) where the broker has possession of what he is 
employed to sell or is empowered to obtain possession 
of what he is employed to purchase, although properly 
speaking he is, in these cases, a factor. A factor may 
sell goods in his own name without disclosing that of 
his principal. 
Also probative is the comment in 35 Corpus Juris 
Secondum, Section lc. There it states that a factor is 
an agent who, in pursuance of his usual trade or busi-
ness and for a commission or factorage, sells goods 
consigned or intrusted to his possession for that purpose 
by the owner. Although a factor usually sells goods 
the agency may include the purchase of goods. Section 
le. provides that the relationship of principal and factor 
is one of agency and in order to preserve the relation-
ship it is not necessary that the factor advertise the 
fact of his agency to his customer. 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Brokers, Section 4, points 
out that a factor is entrusted with possession, control 
in disposal of property and may buy it in his own name 
15 
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(emphasis added) and bind the principal whereas a 
broker usually is not entrusted with custody and is not 
authorized to buy in his own name. One may combine 
features of both factor and broker as being empowered 
to take possession of that which he is employed to pur-
chase. 
Despite a considerable search no case has been 
found involving a purchase of a motor vehicle by an 
agent-factor or broker. Other cases have been located, 
however, which are considered to be controlling as to 
the law applicable in the case at hand. Noteworthy in 
this regard is the case of Twohig vs. Lawrence Ware-
house Co., 118 F Supp. 322. There the plaintiff entered 
into an agreement with the Mid States Packing Com-
pany under which plaintiff became an agent for the 
purpose of purchasing cattle for the Packing Company 
on a commission basis. The plaintiff was to advance the 
purchase price for his principal and the principal would 
then reimburse the plaintiff. In complying with this 
arrangement the plaintiff purchased some cattle for 
the Packing Company and he shipped them by railroad 
according to instructions of the principal. As to the 
nature of the relationship concerned between the plain-
tiff and the Packing Company the Court held this was 
one wherein the plaintiff was an agent of the Packing 
Company for the purpose of buying cattle. The Court 
enumerated the incidents of their relationship which 
indicated the legal status of principal-agent. These 
were ( 1) the plaintiff was to receive a commission per 
head of cattle bought. The Court opined as to this that 
16 
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owner-sellers do not receive commiSSions or fees for 
services but agents do. ( 2) Plaintiff shipped the cattle 
to the principal and the plaintiff was not shown as the 
owner of record. ( 3) Plaintiff did not hold title to the 
cattle or exercise any control after shipment. The cattle 
were delivered by truckers by receipt of the principal 
only. No bills of lading or other devices were used by 
the plaintiff to retain dominion over the cattle once 
delivered to the carrier. It was contemplated by the 
parties in this arrangement, and followed in practice, 
that after delivery of the cattle to the carrier full do-
minion over them was in the principal. 
It is submitted that the Twohig case is strikingly 
similar to the cas.e at hand and that as to all essential 
elements of agency they are identical. In both cases 
the agent-factor, who purchased or arranged for the 
purchase of personalty, was to and did receive a com-
mission or fee for their actions. In neither case was 
the agent-buyer the owner of the personalty nor did 
they appear as owner on the records of title and they 
had possession temporarily only for the purpose of 
shipment and carrying out duties of the agency. In 
both cases the principal was shown on documents and 
records of title as the owner of the rna terial purchased, 
not the agent, and the agent exercised no dominion or 
control over said property once put into the hands of 
a shipper or carrier for delivery to or on behalf of the 
principal. 
Likewise probative is the case of Bashford vs. A. 
LeYy & J. Zentner Co., 11 P 2d 51. There a contract 
17 
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was entered into between plaintiff and defendant under 
which plaintiff was to solicit and find fresh fruits for 
the defendant on terms approved by the defendant. 
Plaintiff was then to pack and load the fruits at his 
own expense and ship the same to or as directed by 
defendant. The defendant for this service was to pay 
the plaintiff the regular commercial packing rates for 
fruit purchased, packed and loaded, out of which he 
received his commission or fee. The above payment 
was to include the costs of purchase of the fruit plus 
those for packing and shipment and this payment was 
to be made when the cars were loaded. The defendant 
advanced the plaintiff money for expenses and these 
advances were to be periodically deducted from packing 
charges paid at $50.00 per car. The Court held that 
this arrangement was that of principal-agent with the 
plaintiff holding the status of agent of the defendant 
for the purpose of buying fruit and shipping the same 
to or at the behest of the defendant. The Court further 
held that the defendant had improperly and without 
cause terminated this agency agreement and was liable 
to the plaintiff for damages. The Court said in this 
regard, "This leaves for our consideration the question 
of whether or not the plaintiff violated the duties which 
an agent owes to his principal to such an extent that 
defendant was justified in terminating the agency and 
ending plaintiff's rights under the agreement." It was 
held as to this that the plaintiff had exercised reasonable 
care and skill and although some fruits were lost or 
damaged in shipment he was exonerated for he did 
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not have to make a "perfect" pack but was required 
only to adhere to the standards usual and customary 
in the trade. The Court also held that the plaintiff-agent 
was not restricted under the agreement to working 
exclusively for the defendant-principal but that he 
might also buy for others too. 
It is also submitted that the Bashful case is on 
all fours as to the major aspects and factors of agency 
to the case at hand. In both cases a commission was 
to be paid out of packing and shipping expenses. In 
both the agent-factor was to locate and purchase or 
arrange for the purchase by the principal of personal 
property and to ship the same. In both the funds used 
were those of the principal although it's clear the agent 
could use his own funds too. The goods in both cases 
were purchased for the principal and title to the same 
was in the principal. Further it should be noted in both 
cases that the_principal did not control the hourly ac-
tions of the agent and had real control only as to the 
ultimtae terms of purchase. 
See also the case of Couturie vs. Roensch, 134 SW 
413. There the buyer of cattle was held to be a factor-
agent even though he received compensation in the 
form of a fixed salary and not a commission. 
Also of interest is the case of Beakley vs. Rainier, 
78 SW 702. There the plaintiff had agreed to buy 
pecans for the defendant. The defendant refused to 
pay for a carload of pecans bought and shipped by 
the plaintiff. Judgment was given for the plaintiff but 
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on appeal this was reversed and remanded. This was 
not reversed on the grounds of agency, however, for 
the Court held on appeal that the plaintiff was a factor-
agent of defendant and was entitled to reimbursement 
at the average cost of pecans he had bought for the 
defendant. The agreement between the parties was to 
the effect that plaintiff would buy pecans for the de-
fendant and would ship them. The plaintiff bought some 
pecans in his own name, not disclosing his principal 
but as factor. The ruling further held that the factor's 
lien extends only to the amount owing by the principal 
for funds advanced by the factor-agent. What is con-
sidered important, however, is the fact that the relation-
ship is basically as it was in the case at hand and the 
court opined that the buyer was a factor-agent of the 
defendant-principal and that the factor did have lien 
rights as to property purchased when the principal 
owed him for money advanced for the purchase by the 
agent-buyer. The case was remanded for further trial 
oii other issues. 
POINT II 
THAT AS AGENT DEFENDANT ACTED 
WITH REASONABLE CARE AND DILI-
GENCE AND IS NOT LIABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF FOR THE DEFECT OF TITLE 
TO THE CADILLAC AUTOMOBILE AND 
THAT THE RULING OF THE TRIAL 
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COURT MADE AT THE TIME OF PRESEN-
T,\TION OF EVIDENCE TO THE COURT 
\VAS THAT DEFENDANT WOULD BE EN-
TITLED TO JUDGMENT IF THE COURT 
FOUND THE DEFENDANT TO BE THE 
AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
A minor amount of testimony was adduced during 
the trial pointing toward the issue of the reasonableness 
of the defendant's actions in checking the title to the 
Cadillac automobile. It is considered, however, that 
more than enough is shown to indicate that the de-
fendant did not use reasonable care and diligence. In 
this regard 35 CJS, Section 20, points out that a factor 
must ordinarily exercise only reasonable care, skill and 
diligence in his dealings for his principal and is respon· 
sible only for such losses as result from his failure to 
do so. He is not an insurer and he does not guarantee 
that he will not commit error. In this regard the plain-
tiff's witness (page 3 transcript) testified that the usual 
and custmary place for checking serial numbers of auto-
mobiles was to do just what the defendant did, i.e., 
check the number on the placque screwed on the door 
jamb of the automobile. Note as to this that the case 
of Bashford vs. A Levy & .J. Zentner Co., supra, held 
that a factor-agent would not be liable for loss to his 
principal if the agent adhered to the usual and custo-
mary standards of care in the trade. See also .Justice 
vs. Broch, 131 P 38, where the court said a factor 
would be liable for negligence but not errors in judg-
ment and he is not an insurer against mistake. 
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In any event this issue is considered to be im-
material for the purposes of this appeal. After the 
basic facts as to the actions of the defendant in check-
ing the title were presented to the trial court the court 
ruled that the sole question determinative of the case 
was whether or not the defendant acted as agent of the 
plaintiff with respect to the Cadillac automobile. If 
he did Judge VanCott ruled that the defendant would 
be entitled to judgment in his favor. Thereafter further 
testimony, the oral arguments to the Court and the 
trial brief submitted by the defendant concentrated 
upon the issue of whether or not an agency relationship 
existed between the parties as to said automobile. It is 
considered this ruling of the trial court is and was cor-
rect and that the defendant is entitled to judgment 
if he is the agent of the plaintiff. Should the issue of 
reasonable care be considered important or controlling 
it is prayed that the matter be remanded to the trial 
court for further testimony and argument to the trial 
court on the merits of such issue. 
CONCLUSION 
It i~ believed to be clear in the light of the fore-
going cases and general authorities that Mr. Fish acted 
as the factor-agent of the plaintiff in finding and nego-
tiating for the purchase by the plaintiff of the Cadillac 
automobile concerned herein. All essential elements of 
such agency relationship are shown to exist between 
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the parties. Payment of a fixed or variable commission; 
purchase in the name of the agent or the principal for 
personal property to be delivered and shipped to the 
principal; use of funds of the principal or funds of the 
agent with reimbursement therefor; lack of ownership 
or title in the agent and the agent not exercising do-
minion over the property once shipped without reten-
tion of any indicia of title, ownership or control. 
That as such agent the defendant is not liable for 
the defect of title of the motor vehicle in that the de-
fendant used reasonable care and diligence in the trans-
action even according to the testimony of the plaintiff's 
own expert witness. That in any event at the trial such 
issue was not fully explored nor argued and is im-
material as to this appeal. 
Wherefore it is prayed that the defendant be held 
to be the agent of the plaintiff and that judgment for 
the plaintiff be reversed in favor of the defendant. 
That in the alternative, should care and diligence be 
the determining issue, that the matter be remanded for 
further testimony and argument on· said issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK FAIRCLOUGH 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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